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 1 
THE VITORIAN RECOVERY AND THE (RE)TURN TOWARDS A 




A recent return of interest in the question of history within International legal 
scholarship has been accompanied by an increased focus on debt that the discipline 
owes to European imperialism.
1
 Furthermore, in parallel with this resurgence of 
historical/postcolonial international legal scholarship, greater attention is also being 
paid to the political-theological elements of legal violence, developing understandings 
of ways in which violence continues to gain operative function through the workings 
of the law, despite the presupposition of international law being a mechanism for 
guaranteeing international peace.
2
 However, still largely underdeveloped in the 
literature is a reading that stresses the connection between these two theoretical 
insights, the claim of the enduring legacy of European imperialism within 
international law and the claim of law’s ability to facilitate violence within a social 
order that ostensibly denies such violence an existence. In this article, I offer a 
theoretical framework for understanding the operation of violence within the 
contemporary global legal order by illustrating how the structure of the liberal, post-
colonial vision of an international legal community that emerged over the twentieth 
century, marries with the model of community produced and sustained by sacrificial 
violence, as described by philosophical anthropologist René Girard. Drawing on 
Girard’s idea of sacrificial violence, I will illustrate how the legal violence inflicted 
upon the colonialized subject can function as productive, rather than destructive, of 
the communality of international law, following the Benjaminian dictate of the 
violence of the law functioning so as to be law-making or law-preserving.
3
 Applying 
the notion of sacrifice brings into play alternate understandings of law’s claim to 
                                                        
1
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‘maintain international peace’, challenging conventional narratives of international 
law in the twentieth century so as critique the assumption of our current global legal 
community being a neutral, horizontal order of peace in that arose following two 
world wars in the first half of the century.
4
 In making this argument, I will be 
engaging with the historical recovery of the jurisprudence of the Spanish theologian 
Francisco de Vitoria, who returned to prominence in the early twentieth century when 
celebrated by liberal jurists as international law’s paterfamilias.
5
 I will examine the 
ways in which Vitoria’s model of universal humanity, developed at the origin of 
European colonialism, was retrieved in the twentieth century and then used to serve as 
a framework for the refashioning, rather than removal of, imperial violence in 
postcolonial international law.  
 
This article illuminates the imperial violence that persists within the humanism of 
liberal, postcolonial international law through critically reviewing Vitoria’s ideas in 
the context of their recovery after the Great War. To place Vitoria’s schema in 
response to the crisis the Great War caused for the given legal order asks new 
questions regarding the potency of his ideas for the twentieth century and their 
implication in the qualified inclusion of former colonial subjects into the international 
community in the second half of the century. Was there something of the outbreak of 
mimetic warfare between the great empires of the world and crucially, the abject 
failure of international law to restrain this crisis that injected Vitoria’s ideas with new 
life nearly four hundred years after they were first expressed? In response to this 
question, I will unpack the ways in which a return of interest in Vitoria was indicative 
of a wider shift in the conceptualisation of international community at this time, a 
shift away from the hierarchical order of competing empires, towards the moral, 
postcolonial, universal community claimed by contemporary international law. 
Vitoria’s ideas, in their twentieth century form, help us to understand the (re)turn 
towards an international legal order that was, as I would rather describe, sacrificial. 
Through the notion of a sacrificial international law, a connection between the 
Vitorian recovery and the enduring imperial violence of contemporary international 
                                                        
4
 Chapter 1, Article 1 (1) of U.N Charter states ‘The Purposes of the United Nations are 1. To maintain 
international peace and security’ U.N. Charter available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml [02/09/14] 
5
 Vitoria is read as the father of international law in, e.g., A Anghie (2005); C Rossi, Broken Chain of 
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law can be drawn. Furthermore, this theoretical concept allows for a greater light  to 
be placed on how former colonial subjects continued to be excluded from the 
international community even in their postcolonial inclusion, enabling them to take up 
their interior/exterior position required of a sacrificial victim. However before 
unpacking this concept of a sacrificial international law, it is important to initially 
contextualise the return of Vitoria’s ideas by tracing the dispute over the significance 





Many contemporary international legal historians now locate the ‘origin’ of the 
discipline in the texts of Vitoria.
6
 More specifically, it is in two sets of Vitoria’s 
lectures – De Indis Noviter Inventis and De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros – 
that the birth of international legal jurisprudence has been identified.
7
 These lectures 
are a juridical conceptualisation of the relations between the Spanish and the 
Amerindians in Vitoria’s time, in other words, the ordering of the formative relations 
of the European colonial project. To posit Vitoria as an origin for international law is 
to accept, as influential Vitoria reader Anthony Anghie states, that international law 
‘did not precede and thereby effortlessly resolve the problem of Spanish-Indian 
relations; rather, international law was created out of the unique issues generated by 
the encounter between the Spanish and the Indians’.
8
 However, after initially 
influencing a generation of sixteenth and seventeenth century scholars who followed 
in his wake at the School of Salamanca, Vitoria’s legacy began to rescind as the 
centre of gravity for European imperialism moved away from Spain to the 
                                                        
6
 See D Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, 27.1 Harvard International Law Journal (1986) 1-98; 
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7
 See A Anghie (2005); and P Fitzpatrick, ‘Latin roots: The force of international law as event’, in F 
Johns, R Joyce & S Pahuja (eds), Events: The Force of International Law (Routledge, 2011) 43-55. 
8
 A Anghie (2005) 15. 
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Netherlands, France and Great Britain.
9
 By the turn of the twentieth century, Vitoria’s 
influence was greatly reduced in the accepted historical narrative of international law, 
overshadowed by the likes of Hugo Grotius, the most common figure placed in the 
role of ‘forefather of international law’ at that time, with Vitoria marginalised as a 
representative of a pre-modern, theologically informed natural law.
10
 However, once 
the rivalry between European empires imploded into warfare on an unprecedented 
scale, Vitoria returned to prominence. As Carl Schmitt argues ‘after World War I, a 
“renaissance” of Vitoria and late Spanish scholasticism marked an especially 
interesting phenomenon in the history of international law.’
11
 Vitoria’s contribution to 
the birth of international law was resurrected, with a plethora of new literature 
generated that presented him no longer as a pre-modern theologian but more as a 
visionary who provided guidance for those looking for a more liberal international 
legal order.
12
 In the inter-war period, the first editions of Vitoria’s work appeared in 
Spanish, French and English, Camilo Barcia Trelles began to present courses on 
Vitoria at the Hague Academy of international law, the University of Salamanca 
created the Francisco de Vitoria Chair and Vitoria-Suarez International Association 
was established in 1932.
13
 In the Anglosphere, the recovery and promotion of 
Vitoria’s writings was primarily led by American legal scholar James Brown Scott, 
who envisioned Vitoria as the theoretical example for the USA to follow as it 
embarked upon its own emergence onto the international stage.
14
 For Scott, Vitoria’s 
insistence on the humanity of the colonised Amerindian, in opposition to the 
prevailing consensus of his time, was an ideal point of origin from which he could 
ground his own conception of an international law founded on a moral universalism. 
In the wake of the violent crisis of the Great War, Scott endeavoured to recuperate 
Vitoria’s legacy by arguing that ‘the corner-stone of Vitoria's system was equality of 
states, applicable not merely to the states of Christendom and of Europe but also to 
                                                        
9 In the 18th and 19th Century, the figures of the natural law tradition continue to reference Vitoria but 
with increasing scarcity, especially once positivism becomes mainstream international legal 
jurisprudence. 
10
 M Koskenniemi (2014) 121. 
11
 C Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, 117. 
12
 For some of the literature on Vitoria produced in this period see, Francisco de Vitoria De Indis et De 
ivre belli relectiones, Ernest Nys, Johann Georg Simon, Herbert Francis Wright, trans. John Pawley 
Bate (eds), (The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917) or Camilo Barcia Trelles, Francisco de 
Vitoria, Fundador del Derecho Internacional Moderno (Reus, 1928) 
13
 J María Beneyto and J Corti Varela (eds), At the Origins of Modernity: Francisco de Vitoria and the 
Discovery of International Law (Springer, 2017), 104-107 
14
 See J Brown Scott (1934) and The Catholic Conception of International Law (The Lawbook 
Exchange, 2007). 
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the barbarian principalities in the Western World of Columbus’.
15
 Scott retrieved 
Vitoria’s legacy by arguing that the communality of an international legal order was 
inextricably tied to its claim to offer ‘a single moral standard’ applicable to all 
humanity, contrasting against the colonial division in the global order established by 
the European empires.
16
 As well as writing on Vitoria’s legacy himself, Scott also 
facilitated new English additions of Vitoria’s work through the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace.
17
 The spread of the new issues of Vitoria’s writings, 
published in 1917, give an indication of the growing interest in his work that would 
emerge just as given global order became engulfed in conflict. Amplifying the 
potential for international law to function as a unifying moral force, Scott’s recovery 
of Vitoria ‘represents an incredible transmogrification of the postulates of natural law, 
from the Middle Ages to twentieth-century American Neo-Thomism.’
18
 In Vitoria’s 
writings were the jurisprudential antecedents for the international law that liberal 
humanitarians sought contrast against the global order of warring empires that was 
held to have dragged even the ‘civilised’ world into bloodshed; instead they 
advocated for an international law that was unitary, cohesive and ontologically 
complete in its encapsulation of all humanity. The retrieval and repurposing of Vitoria 
and his ideas in service of an early twentieth century reconstruction of international 
law is perhaps best captured by a vignette recounted in the eulogy for James Brown 
Scott published by the American Journal of International Law after his passing: 
 
When the new building for the Department of Justice was completed 
in Washington, it was decided to adorn the ceremonial entrance 
leading from the court of honor with a series of mural panels depicting 
the great lawgivers of history... Unable to locate a likeness from 
which to paint the features of Victoria… the artist, hearing of Dr 
Scott's work, sought his advice on a portrait of his subject. 
Unfortunately, Dr Scott had to tell him that none could be found 
anywhere in the world. The artist returned to his mural and painted the 
figure of Victoria garbed true to life as a Dominican friar but with an 
excellent likeness of the head and hands of James Brown Scott. So 
there in the halls of justice at Washington, standing … is a good 
portrait of Dr Scott disguised in the habit of the Dominican theologian 
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 J Brown Scott (1934) 281. 
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 C Rossi (1998) 10. 
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who expounded the law of nations one hundred years before the 




The image of Vitoria recast with the face of leading American international law 
theorist James Brown Scott provides an apt visual metaphor for the way Vitoria was 
remade to respond to a twentieth century crisis of international order. Anne Orford 
recognises the allegorical significance of the above vignette, stating that ‘it is fitting 
that the entrance of the US Department of Justice displays a likeness of Scott in the 
guise of Vitoria, because it is the version of Vitoria created by Scott that would 
provide the ideological justification for the universal law of the American century.’
20
 
The images in question are reproduced below.  
 
Fig 1. Mural of Francisco De Vitoria at U.S. Department of Justice Building. Reproduced from Edward Gordon “The Art 
Of Justice, Or Queen For A Day”, available at The Green Bag Vol.15. (2012) 
  
Fig. 2 Image of Dr James Brown Scott alongside the depiction of Vitoria. Reproduced from Edward Gordon “The Art Of 
Justice, Or Queen For A Day”, available at The Green Bag Vol.15. (2012) 
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The image of Vitoria constructed in this recovery project was of a benevolent father 
figure for international law, celebrated ‘for espousing the interests of indigenous 
populations against a predatory Spanish colonisation of the Americas’.
21
 Vitoria 
returned to influence to be remembered as ‘a man of peace and religion … heroically 
turning against the colonial violence of his own countrymen’.
22
 Vitoria’s recovery 
both informed and mirrored the shift of international law towards imposing what 
James Brown Scott called a ‘single standard of morality’ upon the world at large.
23
 
Previewing the rise of humanitarianism that was to triumph over the twentieth 
century, Scott drew from Vitoria, this notion of ‘a single standard of morality’, in 
which law established ethical norms that bounded the individual lives of people, over 
and above the sovereign states they attached to. Scott explained this ideal further 
when stating: 
 
We have thus the measure of law: it must be moral and it must be 
spiritual in essence-whatever its material content-if it is to be 
consistent with the nature and dignity of humanity, in which right, 
not might, prevails ... Getting underneath the surface of the state, we 
have found it, not a personality, but a body corporate, with many 
members. The international community, made up of states, will 
become a gigantic artificial person unless we continually look behind 




Contrasting itself against an overly-positivist international law which had failed to 
prevent the outbreak of war, this jurisprudence anchored upon a universal morality 
that could produce what might be termed a ‘oneness’ in the world. With Vitoria being 
the figure that Scott cited as the example to follow for this new model of international 
legal order, he helped to reinstitute an abiding image of the sixteenth-century 
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A Contested Legacy 
 
The image of Vitoria offered by his interwar recovery has been challenged in recent 
years, with a particularly piercing critique offered by Antony Anghie’s book 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (published in 2005). 
Anghie revisited Vitoria’s jurisprudence and argued that, counter to the great 
humanitarian presented in the recovery project, within Vitoria’s work lay an eventual 
accommodation of, rather than an opposition to, the brutalities of the sixteenth-
century Spanish Conquista. Moreover, Anghie stressed that Vitoria’s accommodation 
of violence was particularly dangerous as it was expressed more subtly than that 
favoured by explicit colonial apologists; Vitoria’s jurisprudence masked its violence 
‘precisely because it is presented in the language of liberty and even equality’.
25
 
Anghie did recognise that Vitoria refused to justify colonial violence through 
characterising the Amerindians as an inferior species and as natural slaves, a position 
advocated by other influential Spanish jurists such as Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.
26
 
However, as opposed to reading this refusal as an indication of Vitoria being a 
prototypical altruistic humanist, Anghie spies in Vitoria’s thought a qualification to 
this defence of the colonised: while Vitoria may have seen the Amerindians as 
human, he did not see them as being quite as human as the Spanish, who were by 
extension elevated into the condition of the pre-determined standard for humanity.  
 
Anghie’s critique marked the culmination of a stream of scholarship that offered a 
dissenting opinion against the claims of Scott and the early twentieth-century Vitorian 
recovery. Robert Williams argued that Vitoria's jurisprudence did not provide a moral 
antecedent for twentieth century international law but instead ‘justified the extension 
of Western power […] as an imperative of the European's vision of truth’.
27
 
Furthermore, Carl Schmitt had also defied the humanitarian image of Vitoria being 
offered by inter-war jurists, arguing that Vitoria’s ‘conclusions ultimately justified the 
Conquista’ and through an appeal to a universal morality legitimised the violence of 
                                                        
25
 Ibid 122. 
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 Anghie expanded on this line of critique by bringing into 
clearer focus the extent to which Vitoria’s schema, which recognised the Amerindian 
within an international community yet forgave the violence of the Conquista, laid the 
structure for a ‘dynamic of difference’ between Europeans and non-Europeans to be 
maintained within an ostensibly liberal, non-hierarchical universal order.
29
 Despite 
being included within a ‘single standard of morality’ the colonised were still excluded 
from full membership of the community by the ultimate legitimation of the violence 
that had befallen them. 
 
Anghie’s critique of Vitoria has provoked a response by scholars still committed to 
retaining Vitoria’s humanitarianism. Georg Cavallar argues that it is ‘one-sided to 
present [Vitoria] as an unequivocal accomplice of European colonialism’, citing 
Vitoria’s personal letters commenting on the conquest of Peru by Francisco Pizarro as 
evidence of the extent of his horror at the conquistadors’ bloodlust and explaining his 
reluctance to publicly condemn the conquistadors for fear of the political price he 
would have had to pay for doing so.
30
 Ian Hunter also critiques Anghie’s argument, 
claiming that Anghie and other postcolonial critics of Vitoria fail to extract 
themselves from the project of constructing a universal history that itself inadvertently 
results from a Eurocentric philosophical perspective.
31
Charging the recent Vitoria 
critics with offering an anachronistic reading, Hunter suggests that Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence would not have been received in his own time in terms of either 
producing or failing to produce a ‘global normative order … and cannot be 
understood by modern historians in this way either’.
32
 For Hunter, Vitoria’s lectures 
are best understood by ‘situating them in the immanent conflicts among the rival 
intellectual cultures on which they were based.’
33
 What Hunter and others overlook in 
their plea for contextualism is that, however one might understand Vitoria in his 
sixteenth-century context, there is a distinct twentieth-century version of Vitoria that 
was constructed by the likes of Scott and it is this version that served to inform the 
moalism, universalism and humanitarianism of contemporary international law. 
Encasing Vitoria’s ideas solely in the own time fails to explain why there was a 
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sudden surge of interest in these ideas in the twentieth century, hundreds of years after 
their author’s passing; a crude contextualism also does not explain why Vitoria is 
retrieved to be proffered as the ‘father’ of international law just as scholars sought a 
fresh jurisprudence to shift the global legal order away from a cycle of imperial 
competition and world war. A deeper consideration of the theoretical challenge facing 
international law at the time of Vitoria’s recovery following the Great War helps to 
address these questions and respond to the argument against reading of Vitoria’s 
humanitarian schema as sustaining an imperial ‘dynamic of difference’ through the 
backdoor.  
 
More Than ‘A Scrap of Paper’ 
 
When, with an evangelical zeal, James Brown Scott called for jurists to abandon the 
‘paths marked out by false prophets of international law’ and turn back to ‘the 
Vitorian principles which for four hundred years have pointed the path to an 
international law still of the future, in which law and morality shall be one and 
inseparable,’ he sought to address the unmooring of international law from its moral 
and universalist roots as had occurred with the rise of positivism in the previous 
century.
34
 Over the course of the nineteenth century, international law had become 
preoccupied by an intra-disciplinary debate between naturalism and positivism, a 
debate in which positivism would eventually gain pre-eminence.
35
 At the height of 
European colonialism, the influence of positivist jurisprudence directed international 
law away from its theologically-informed, natural-law roots towards a more scientific 
theoretical grounding. Moving away from anchoring international law upon moralistic 
notions such as what are rights, what is just or what is the good, positivist 
international law theorised an order based on the recognition of sovereignty and the 
task of harmonising the interests of the different sovereign entities.
36
 The 
consequence of this shift was to fix the state and its sovereign authority as ‘the most 
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basic doctrinal and philosophical underpinnings for international law.’
37
 As a result of 
this jurisprudential shift, international law began to be shorn of its moralistic element 





This understanding of international law exhausted itself with the outbreak of the Great 
War when, due to its failure to contain escalating imperial rivalry, ‘international law 
died its first death on 1 August 1914.’
39
 Law’s inability to enact a binding power on 
sovereign states was exposed by German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann 
Hollweg’s famous dismissal of international treaties as just a ‘scrap of paper.’
40
 The 
Vitorian recovery occurred in the context of jurisprudence seeking to address this 
failing. Stressing the need to remember that international law ultimately governed 
people, not only sovereigns, Scott stated that ‘if we continue to look upon the state as 
an artificial person, instead of a thing of men and women and children, we may end 
by being the victims of our Frankenstein-a soulless mechanical thing which inevitably 
destroys itself.’
 41
 Scott credited the conflicting interests of great states as the source 
of the violence in the international arena, illustrating an appreciation of the dangers of 
escalating rivalry amongst states unless constrained by a restraining force, which 
could be something best described as a shared universal culture.
42
 Scott decried 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence’s abandonment of international law to ‘the dictates 
of the artificial entities which we call states’ and instead sought to influence 
international law towards a reworking of Vitoria’s moral humanism for a renewed 
universal international community.
43
 However, recalling the critique of Vitoria 
offered by Anghie and other postcolonial scholars who read Vitoria as ultimately 
accommodating the colonial violence of Spanish conquest within his ostensible 
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generous universal humanism, we may ask if this model of community that Scott 
retrieves from Vitoria and repurposes for the service of a crisis-ridden twentieth 
century legal order could be better understood, not just as humanitarian, but as what I 
term as ‘sacrificial.’  
 
Girard and Sacrifice 
 
The potency of sacrifice as a conceptual model for community production is most 
clearly illuminated in the work of French philosophical anthropologist Rene Girard. 
Girard challenges any presumption of communities and social orders being the 
product of spontaneous consensus rooted in peace and communality. Instead he 
conceptualises that peace as being anchored in a sacrificial violence – which he 
explains as being the paradoxical outcome of the insight that violence may only be 
contained by violence. Through his reading of archaic ritual, Girard offers an 
understanding of religion as functioning not only to facilitate the worship of the deific 
but, also, to allow the tying together of the social order as a constitutive whole. It is 
worth recalling that religion as a word is etymologically rooted in the Latin word 
religare – meaning to bind.
44
 Girard begins his study by examining archaic societies 
‘where institutions such as political or penal systems have not yet come into focus.’
45
 
In these societies, he suggests, an immediate problem is that of community formation- 
how does the group externalise violence from within its midst to allow community to 
emerge? For Girard, the answer is to be found in the operative functions of sacrifice. 
To be briefly reductive in the service of clarification, Girard’s theory can be described 
in two movements: firstly a recognition of the mimetic nature of violence leading to 
escalation that threatens to engulf social order due to a preponderance for violence to 
spiral exponentially and secondly, the reliance on a scapegoat mechanism as being the 
only means by which this violence might be contained and therefore allow a social 
order to be founded. The first step, which is the understanding of violence as 
functioning mimetically, illustrates how violence within a social order acts as 
contagious, with one act of violence being reciprocated for another, escalating to a 
                                                        
44
 S. F. Hoyt, “The Etymology of Religion”, in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 32, No. 
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crisis unless contained by some sort of limiting system.
46
 The second step, the 
reliance on the scapegoat mechanism, is for Girard, the sacrificial ritual that functions 
as this limiting system in that it facilitates the transfer of this potential escalating 
violence onto a ‘legitimate’ victim, a victim included in the community but in such a 
manner that it is always excluded so that the community somehow justifies it as 
deserving of violence. Girard illuminates the workings of this mechanism of 
productive violence in clear detail when he says: 
 
The violence directed against the surrogate victim might well be 
radically generative in that, by putting an end to the vicious and 
destructive cycle of violence, it simultaneously initiates another and 
constructive cycle, that of the sacrificial rite—which protects the 




Furthermore, Girard reads the law as inheriting this office of sacrificial community 
production within modernity. For Girard, the work of the sacrificial mechanism 
persists in ‘one of our social institutions above all: our judicial system.’
48
 When these 
ideas are read alongside the insights of Benjamin and other scholars of law’s relation 
to violence, Girard’s philosophy becomes to tool through we can illuminate how legal 
violence can actually be productive, rather than destructive of a legal order. Following 
modernity, the law functions as to ‘secularise’ the sacrificial ritual, as Girard 
highlights when arguing: 
 
It is that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when 
that system replaces sacrifice. This obscurity coincides with the 
transcendental effectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and 





Girard’s schema suggests an alternative understanding of twentieth century 
international law’s shift towards a more universal, humanitarian communality. 
Furthermore, it shines new light on the relevance of Vitoria and his ‘single standard of 
morality’, as Scott would describe it, to the shifts occurring over this moment. By 
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this, I mean that the debate between the two images of Vitoria - one of a theologian 
whose generous invitation of the colonised into the universal order of man was 
founded on his Christian moralism, and the other of an imperial apologist who 
ultimately justified the violence of the Conquista in even more totalitarian terms – 
are, to my reading, myopic in that these two visions of Vitoria can be reconciled 
through an understanding of the ‘sacrificial’ element of imperial violence.  
 
Vitoria, Colonialism and Law’s Theological Inheritance 
 
Vitoria provides an appropriate point of departure for reading an element of sacrifice 
within international law: not only does his thought directly concern the colonial 
context and its legalised violence, but it also disrupts the presumption of international 
law’s claim to an immanent ontological completeness, because it ‘straddles the divide 
between a medieval world … and a secularised modernity’.
50
 Vitoria’s work and 
biography struggle to fit within modern law’s claims of facilitating a rational 
disenchantment of the world; even at his most humanistic, the spectre of theology 
consistently haunts Vitoria’s jurisprudence. The twentieth-century recovery of Vitoria 
sought, ostensibly, to secularise the Dominican friar through a celebration of his 
rebellion against medieval papal political authority, arguing that by not grounding his 
jurisprudence in the power of the Christian church, Vitoria contributes to modernity’s 
turn away from religion. In addition to his rejection of the natural slavery of the 
colonised, emphasis was placed on how Vitoria’s shifting away from the received 
arguments that justified Spanish colonialism also constituted a break with the 
universal authority of the papacy. On one level, Vitoria’s shift in this regard should 
not be easily dismissed; in practice it meant that his response to the colonial question 
‘constituted both heresy [against the pope] and treason [against the Emperor]’.
51
 
However, it must also be stressed that Vitoria remained a theologian throughout; his 
Thomistic training, as well as his concern with the internal rivalries plaguing the 
Christian church at the time, remained central to his entire jurisprudence.
52
 To 
appreciate why Vitoria’s jurisprudence could be read alongside the theological 
restraining force that Girard sees in the juridical system and why Scott and others 
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were drawn to Vitoria’s work in the midst of contagious global warfare, it is helpful 
to remember that Vitoria’s own writings were produced within an era of rivalry within 
Christendom. Ramon Hernandez describes Vitoria’s time as one in which:  
 
The revolution represented by Martin Luther's reforms had erupted in a 
manner that called into question the very internal constitution of 
ecclesiastical society. In the political order, the confrontation between 
Christian princes, the interminable wars between France and Spain, 
and the conflicts in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, had 




It is instructive to consider Vitoria’s thoughts on the Conquista not only as an attempt 
to schematise Spanish-Amerindian relations but also as an attempt to abate the rivalry 
flaring within Christendom. When unpacking the Vitorian invention of the 
Amerindian legal personality, it should be recalled that ‘Vitoria and his successors 
were far less concerned with the particulars of the American case than they were with 
the opportunities it provided for a refutation of Lutheran and later, Calvinist theories 
of sovereignty’.
54
 In response to the reformation, which shattered Christendom within 
Vitoria’s lifetime, the ‘discovery’ of the Americas served as a release valve for a 
political order descending into the crisis of rivalry.
55
 In this straddling of the divide 
between the theological and the political, Vitoria’s international legal schema could 
be read as one concerned ‘not just on the assertion of a sovereign statehood but also 
on the quality, the communal quality, of the international’.
56
 In other words, the 
tradition of Vitorian jurisprudence offered an obvious source to be exhumed in the 
twentieth century as an earlier moment of the production of ‘coherence’ within 
international legal order as it was caught the midst of internal and seemingly 
escalating crisis.  
 
As the Prime Professor of Theology at the University of Salamanca, Vitoria interwove 
the religious and the political in responding to the key question of his time: what was 
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the system of law that could account for and govern Spanish-Amerindian relations.
57
 
From the moment that confirmation of Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the 
Americas was received in Spain, the question of law became an urgent one. Upon his 
‘discovery’, Columbus dispatched a letter to Luis de Santangel, finance minister to 
the Crown of Castile and Aragon, stating: ‘I found many islands filled with people 
innumerable, and of them all I have taken possession for their highnesses, by 
proclamation made and with royal standard unfurled’.
58
 Implicit within Columbus’s 
statement is a provocation: ‘what meaning could his legal ceremonies have for the 
people who were ostensibly to be bound by them’?
59
 In other words, the juridical 
question of what was the law that should be followed when the Spanish encountered 
the Amerindian on the American continent? Was there a universal law that could be 
referred to and, if so, what held it together?  
 
A Sacrificial ‘jus gentium’ 
 
The first lesson that Scott and his contemporaries could draw from the Vitorian 
schema was to eschew any insistence on a universal law born from the dominion of 
respublica Christiana. By that time of his twentieth-century recovery, the explicitly 
religious juridical authority that Vitoria had first turned away from was now firmly 
attached to the pre-modern world.
60
 Vitoria therefore was heralded as a prototypical 
liberal not only due to his generosity to the Amerindians, but also because this 
generosity was founded on the discourse of natural law rather than through deferring 
to the divine law claimed by the Christian Church to carry universal jurisdiction. 
Vitoria’s work commences from an understanding that for divine law to govern 
relations between the Spanish and Amerindians would require it to be relatable to 
both Christians and heathens alike. His writings do not deny the universal spiritual 
authority of Christ, but recognise that this does not translate into stable grounds for a 
universal political authority to be claimed by the Pope as Christ’s earthly vicar. 
Instead, Vitoria states that while Christ ‘may have spiritual power over the whole 
                                                        
57
 A Pagden (1987) 79. 
58
 Christopher Columbus, ‘Letter of Columbus on the First Voyage’, trans. Cecil Jane (ed.), The Four 
Voyages of Columbus, 2 vols (Dover, 1988), vol. 1, 1. 
59
 A Anghie (2005) 16. 
60
 See C Rossi (1998). Chapter 4 gives a comprehensive account of how the debates between 
positivism and natural law fuelled Scott’s recovery of Vitoria. 
 17 
world, over unbelievers as much as the faithful … the Pope does not have that power 
over unbelievers’, as evidenced by his inability to ‘excommunicate them or prevent 
them from marrying’. Ultimately, Vitoria makes a stark shift away from the 
hegemony of Rome when he declares that ‘the Pope is not civil or temporal lord of 
the whole world in the proper sense of the words “lordship” and “civil power”’.
61
 
Vitoria’s texts instead provide the grounds for a universal, unifying law as sourced 
from the human world, allowing the later recovery of his work to offer an image of 
Vitoria as being a proto-secularist. However, unlike the image of Vitoria as a ‘friend 
of the natives’, ‘Vitoria the secularist’ is an image attested-to not only by those who 
celebrate Vitoria like Scott, but also by recent critics like Anghie, who despite 
challenging the image of Vitoria as a humanitarian still accept that ‘Vitoria clears the 
way for his own elaboration of a new, secular, international law’.
62
 However, an 
overemphasis on the secularism of Vitoria’s thought overlooks the extent to which it 





The extent to which the theological continued to inform Vitoria’s jurisprudence 
becomes particularly relevant when considering the idea of the communality that held 
international law together offered by his texts. Vitoria’s refusal of the Papal Bulls 
provoked a jurisprudential shift, moving understandings of global order away from a 
presupposed division between ‘areas of Christian lawfulness and areas without law, 
and thence ripe for free acquisition’.
64
 The delinking of the rights offered by law from 
a mandate for inclusion within the Christendom signals an emerging shift away from 
a notion of the Christian as the ideal universal subject, towards the notion of ‘human’ 
serving as the anchor for ‘a single standard of morality.’ However, it can be 
problematized whether Vitoria’s writings do in fact not a complete break between a 
world governed by divine law and one governed by natural law, perhaps instead they 
offer an example of an attempt to draw the transcendence of divine law into the 
natural world. Kathleen Davis makes this point clearer when she states: 
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Far from displacing divine law, Vitoria is advocating a particular 
understanding of the fundamental position of divine law in the world. 
… Shifting the authority over divine law from the precarious hold of 
the papacy, Vitoria articulates a comprehensive, universal legal theory 
that places all law (human/civil, natural, the law of nations) and all 




A single, universal standard of law applying to all humans emerges as a deific 
surrogate for the modern age, arrogating to itself the omnipotence that had previously 
been the sole preserve of a jealous God. The universal, humanist tradition that held 
Vitoria as a forefather may extract the political order of law from a reliance on this 
theological, external reference point, but they do so not by detaching from the 
reverential power of the transcendent, but rather, in a Promethean gesture, by stealing 
the transcendent reference point so as to bring it into the law itself. China Miélville 
goes some way towards illuminating the fallacy of Scott’s characterisation of Vitoria 
as a secularist harbinger of modernity, arguing that ‘Vitoria is neither the modern 
thinker nor the liberal he is sometimes painted. His spatial conceptualisation of early 
colonialism represents the last, brilliant applications of pre-modern categories to new 
problems’.
66
 In this analysis, Miéville is correct in identifying the extent to which the 
‘pre-modern’ continued to inform Vitoria’s schema, but even Miéville misrecognises 
this point as evidence of Vitoria producing a ‘paradoxical proto-modernity.’
67
 Rather 
than Vitoria’s indebtedness to the pre-modern categorising him as proto-modern, his 
ability to straddle the sacred and the secular actually captures the full nature of 
modernity. The paradox does not indicate a proto-modernity; the containment of the 
paradox is the act of modernity itself.  
 
The haunting presence of the theological within the ostensibly secular is an argument 
well-rehearsed by critical scholars.
68
 However, the potency of the notion of ‘sacrifice’ 
is that it helps to bring to the forefront the connection between the theological, the 
political and the desire to contain the outbreak of violence in communities. With the 
law holding contagious violence in check, the modern secularised jurist can dismiss 
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the need for an explicitly theological anchor for an omnipotent morality, presuming 
that ‘because we have no need for it, religion itself appears senseless’.
69
 In the 
modern age, the juridical replaces the theological not because it is opposed to the 
religious but because it is even more effective in doing the work of the religious. 
Girard explains further: 
 
The ‘curative’ measures … become increasingly mysterious in their 
workings as they progress in efficiency. As the focal point of the 
system shifts away from religion and the preventive approach is 
translated into judicial retribution, the aura of misunderstanding that 
has always formed a protective veil around the institution of sacrifice 





In short, the law contains, in both senses of the word, the violence of the society. This 
masking of the persistent sacred quality of law underwrites the Vitorian schema. This 
is only amplified when discussing international law and its claim to universal 
authority. The absence of an overarching authority to quell violent rivalry is resolved 
by way of a negative move, the cathartic inclusion/exclusion of the other. This shift is 
key in understanding the appeal of Vitoria’s innovation in his inclusion of the ‘native’ 
into a single standard of law but in a condition of exclusion so that the ‘native’ both 
remained in contradistinction to the idealised (European) universal human subject and 
that the violence endured by them would be legitimised as being in service of creating 
this universal human community. When reading the Vitorian schema as a method for 
inviting the colonised into the international community but sustaining that ‘dynamic 
of difference’ his appeal to twentieth century jurisprudence as international law 
transitioned away from an order of imperial relations. Moreover, recognising how 
Vitorian schema leaves the colonised in an included/excluded positionality brings the 
revival of his work after the Great War into conversation with Girard’s understanding 
of sacrificial structure of cathartic violence, the displacement of internal rivalry onto 
an included/excluded scapegoat.  
 
Girard presents a theoretical lens for understanding how a universal, humanitarian  
international community seeks to effect a movement from being plagued by 
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contagious violence, as with the mimetic warfare of the Great War, to the ‘peace’ of 
late twentieth century liberal, post-colonial international legal order. The sacrificial 
structure allows the mimetic violence of rival sovereigns to be displaced onto a 
hidden third term, a target structured to serve as a legitimate recipient for this violence 
– a scapegoat. Recognising the echoes of Girard’s sacrificial structure in international 
law, Gregor Noll has emphasised how international legal violence represents a 
‘curative and preventative means’ and coheres community through the form of 
legitimised violence.
71
 However, if the Girardian understanding of the containment of 
rivalry centres on the enacting of sacrifice upon the scapegoat, the obvious corollary 
that presents itself is: who is sacrificed by preventative violence in contemporary 
international law? If the communality of universal humanity is produced through a 
sacrificial violence of the law, who occupies the subject position fulfilled by the 
Girardian scapegoat? A crucial addition to Noll’s insights is the connection between 
the sacrificial and colonial structure of international law. Noll’s application of Girard 
to questions of international law is enriched and further developed by a recognition of 
how the interior/exterior positionality that Girard mandates as necessary for the 
scapegoat to exorcise the intra-communal violence, marries with Vitoria’s inclusion 
of the colonised into the international legal order in a condition of exclusion. The 
concept of sacrifice should be read alongside the post-colonial critique of 
international law in a way that is so far absent from the literature, because as a 
concept, it helps explain the persistence of violent imperial relations in an ostensibly 
post-colonial world. Furthermore, to provide the conceptual work on sacrifice and 
generative violence in international law a historical grounding in Vitoria’s writings, 
helps to bring together divergent literature on post-colonial and political theological 
critiques of international law as well as helping to provide deeper context for the 
twentieth-century recovery of Vitoria. 
 
The Inclusive/Exclusion of the Colonial Subject 
 
As aforementioned, the image of Vitoria that was established by his twentieth-century 
recovery was that of a great humanist, in the words of Scott, ‘a broad-minded, high-
minded and charitable person’ who could serve as an inspiration for a new age of 
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 Leading early twentieth-century American 
international theorist, Quincy Wright tied Vitoria into a tradition of moral 
humanitarianism alongside Bartolome de las Casas, Thomas Clarkson and William 
Wilberforce.
73
 As a result of this image scholars continue to celebrate Vitoria for the 
way that ‘his concept of human rights suggests a form of moral cosmopolitanism’, 
which recognised the humanity of the Amerindian at a time that few others could.
74
 
However, as the more recent critique of Vitoria has now shown, Vitoria’s inclusion of 
the Amerindian inside the borders of a universal humanity ultimately only ‘endorses 
the imposition of Spanish rule on the Indians by another argument’.
75
 In addition to 
the now familiar critique of Vitoria’s writings allowing for an apology for colonial 
violence through the backdoor, a further argument to offer is how Vitoria’s inclusion 
of Amerindians within the universal order can be further understood as an essential 
prerequisite to the licensing of a sacrificial violence upon them, in order to produce 
the resultant international community.  
 
De Indis Noviter Inventis begins by recognising that, ‘before the Spanish arrived, 
these barbarians possessed [as] true [a] dominion’ over their land as any Christian did 
over their own.
76
 Vitoria dismisses the idea that Amerindians fitted the model of 
natural slaves and therefore all excesses were licensed upon them. Vitoria’s writings 
recognises the Amerindian alongside the rivals of the Christian world, the ‘Saracens 
and Jews’, arguing that if the Spanish could recognise as human their ‘continual 
enemies’, then they could not deny that same recognition to the Amerindian. Vitoria 
concluded that ‘it is no impediment for a man to be a true master, that he is an 
unbeliever’.
77
 To be a heathen did not revoke the humanity of unbelievers, therefore 
neither could it override the dominion they enjoyed over their lands. However, the 
Amerindians were invited into the universal community of mankind with a 
qualification: if they were to be recognised as human, they had to behave like human 
beings, as defined by the predetermined standard already embodied by the Spanish. 
For Vitoria, the Amerindians’ possession of universal reason was a pre-requisite to 
being human and therefore being bound by jus gentium. However, this jus gentium 
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served to saturate the universal with the particularities of Christian Spain. As Anghie 
recognises, Vitoria’s schema resulted in the Amerindian only becoming human 





The cost of entering into Vitoria’s universal humanity was that the Amerindian was 
now bound by a jus gentium which allowed the Spanish ‘right to travel and dwell’ in 
the Americas, the right to ‘trade with the barbarians’ and ‘the right to preach and 
announce the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians’.
79
 If the Amerindians denied the 
Spanish these rights, this would constitute ‘acts of war’, in accordance to Vitoria’s 
international law. As a result, the Spanish would then be fully justified in unleashing 
violence upon the Amerindians in order to enforce their rights. The extract below 
relays the point in full:  
 
If after the Spaniards have used all diligence, both in deed and in 
word, to show that nothing will come from them to interfere with the 
peace and well-being of the aborigines, the latter nevertheless persist 
in their hostility and do their best to destroy the Spaniards, they can 
make war on the Indians, no longer as on innocent folk, but as 
against forsworn enemies and may enforce against them all the 
rights of war, despoiling them of their goods, reducing them to 




Vitoria presents these rights as neutral and reciprocal, implying that the Amerindians 
have as much right to travel and trade in Spain as the Spanish do in the Americas. 
However, Vitoria’s rights could only be read as neutral when divorced from the 
material history from which they were derived. Vitoria’s generosity in articulating a 
universal ‘right to travel’ ignores the fact that movement between the Iberian 
peninsula and the ‘new-world’ was, and would remain, strictly one-way; to invite the 
Amerindian into an emerging world market through a universal ‘right to trade’ is 
blind to the extent to which Spanish-Amerindian trade took the form of plunder rather 
than exchange. The universal ‘right to proselytise’ was articulated with an awareness 
of the impossibility of the Amerindians having ‘the same rights of propaganda and 
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intervention for their idolatry and religious fallacies as Spanish Christians’.
81
 In short, 
the material realities of the context in which he was writing meant that Vitoria’s jus 
gentium, which initially appears to legislate universal rights, in practice ultimately 
authorises Spanish incursion into the Americas. Within this schema, for the 
Amerindians to refuse or attempt to resist these incursions justifies the Spanish in 
waging war upon them. The colonised are therefore fixed as being simultaneously 
inside and outside the boundaries of humanity. Anghie shows that in Vitoria’s 
scheme: 
 
Indians belong to the universal realm like the Spanish … Vitoria 
asserts, they have the facility of reason and hence a means of 
ascertaining jus gentium. However, the Indian is very different 
from the Spaniard because the Indian’s specific social and cultural 
practices are at variance from the practices required by the 
universal norms – which in effect are Spanish practices – and 
which are applicable to both Indian and Spaniard. Thus the Indian 





The Amerindians are awarded the capacity for reason and are therefore recognised as 
human by Vitoria, but in being so recognised they are also determined as failing to 
reach the standards that are expected of a human, at least in their present condition. 
The full realisation of their humanity becomes contingent upon their improvement, 
producing an inclusive/exclusive positionality. That this (im)possible development of 
the colonial subject underwrote the Vitorian schema was recognised by Scott as he 
sought to recovery of Vitoria’s humanism to serve as the key source for twentieth 
century humanitarian international law: 
 
Vitoria recognised that there were peoples in an imperfect state of 
civilisation; but they were human beings, and human beings, to his 
way of thinking, should not be subject to exploitation, but should be 
fitted – if they were not already fit – to enjoy the rights of all human 




However, the inclusion promised is always an inclusion deferred, as the Amerindian 
is invited into the universal whilst also becoming the constitutive outside against with 
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the Spanish are contrasted. The colonised are trapped in an impossible position: full 
inclusion into the universal order is dependent upon being able to conform, to 
progress, or – borrowing from modern parlance – to develop, up to a standard that is 
constituted by the colonised own exclusion.
84
 Vitoria defines the colonising 
Europeans as ‘perfect communities’, Christian social orders that are self-sufficient, 
complete and ontologically whole within themselves.
85
 In contradistinction to this  
perfection are the imperfect communities such as those inhabited by the 
Amerindians.
86
 This imperfection is presented as ‘something lacking’ with the 
colonised assumed as having the potential to be perfect and therefore the use force to 
encourage this progress becomes legitimise.
87
 However, the persistence of this logic 
into the contemporary rhetoric of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ peoples demonstrates 




Vitoria’s work could therefore be taken as offering the creation of the colonised as a 
novel subjectivity, as suggested by his very lecture title: De Indis Noviter Inventis. 
Noviter translates from Latin to English as ‘to reconstitute’, while inventis can mean 
both ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’. These translations suggest the dual role undertaken 
by Vitoria’s lectures: to account for Spanish-Amerindian relations post-discovery, but 
also to constitute the Amerindian in a novel mode of colonial subjectivity. Ultimately, 
it is a subjectivity that is rendered naked before a legitimising and (re)generative 
violence. Recalling the positionality Girard illuminates as necessitating sacrifice, 
Vitoria’s Amerindian is invited into his international community, however the 
invitation is already embedded with violent exclusion. The recognition of the 
legitimate victim’s inclusion in the international community is an essential precursor 
to the catharsis of sacrificial violence being enacted upon them, as illustrated by Noll 
analysis of the parallel between international law and Girardian community 
production:  
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With Girard, the sacrificial victim is a substitute for all members of 
the community. To make substitution work, the scapegoat must first 
be integrated into the life of the community. … The transfer of 
violence from community members to the scapegoat can only 
succeed if the former is ritually assimilated to community members. 
If we revert to an ‘international community’ of states, a plausible 
account of the fettering of violence would presuppose that any 
sacrificial victim would first be integrated into the ‘international 




Vitoria’s jurisprudence allows the colonial subject to be included into the 
international community, into the single standard of morality, before the violence on 
them is ultimately legitimised, thereby giving it a generative force. By appreciating 
the cathartic properties of sacrificial violence, the Vitorian tradition of colonialism-in-
equality no longer appears contradictory but, rather, coherently mythic. By mythic, I 
refer to the way in which sacrificial violence functions so as to be law-making, the 





Upon this understanding the tradition of Vitorian jurisprudence as sacrificial, the 
Girardian reading of the production of a scapegoat on whom violence could be 
licensed becomes apposite. In accordance with Girard’s theory, the sacrificial victim 
‘should belong both to the inside and the outside of the community’.
91
 A subject is 
produced to be both like and unlike the community, a distortion of the model, a failed 
realisation of what should be. It is through this process that the making of ‘the victim 
wholly sacrificeable’ is realised.
92
 As outlined above, Vitoria’s construction of the 
colonised mirrors the subjective qualities required of the Giradian victim. Traversing 
the boundaries of a projected universal humanity, the colonised are exposed to a 
cathartic violence through being a subject both similar enough and different enough to 
absorb the rivalry that threatens to engulf the community as a whole. Viewed through 
Girard’s lens, Vitoria’s inclusion of the colonised within a universal humanity, so 
celebrated by Scott and others in the twentieth century recovery of a liberal tradition 
of international law, merely precedes and facilitates the violence that is ultimately 
visited upon the colonised. Unless the victim is situated within the bounds of the 
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community, it cannot become a signifier for the rivalry within the community, and the 
violence performed upon the victim’s body cannot do its purifying work. In order to 
expunge the internal violence, ‘continuity must be maintained’ between community 
and victim. However, ‘there must also be discontinuity’, which Vitoria effects with 
his formulation of the ‘native’ personality.
93
 The acts of violence upon the colonised 
are now offered as necessitated by their own monstrosity and in service of the desire 
to produce a ‘perfect’ universal community and ideal (European) human subjects.  
 
A Twentieth-Century (Re)Turn towards a Sacrificial International  
 
To understand Vitoria’s jurisprudence as ‘sacrificial’ in a Girardian sense, as in 
aiming at a coherent universal order through first the inclusion and then violent 
exclusion of the colonial subject, helps us to understand why Vitoria was recovered. 
In addition to being the jurist who drove the Vitoria’s recovery, Scott, is himself now 
considered a major figure in the history of liberal international law due to both his 
academic and practical work during this turbulent time of international conflict. As 
aforementioned, Scott championed Vitoria in a flurry of writings and lectures, 
eventually became the driving force behind the establishment of the Vitoria-Suarez 
society, established in 1932 with a Spanish counterpart being instituted in 1936.
94
 
However, Scott had been engaging with Vitoria’s work from his first reading of De 
Indis and De Belli Relectiones in 1906.
95
 Following this early engagement with 
Vitoria, Scott became concerned with placing international law in ‘its true historical 
light.’
96
 A supporter of the League of Nations, international arbitration and the moral 
universalist turn in international law more widely, Scott presented Vitoria’s writings 
as the jurisprudential antecedents for an international law able to respond to the 




The Vitoria that was exhumed and repurposed aided Scott and others in their 
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endeavours to reimagine ‘international law as a war-prevention structure’.
98
 An 
absence of peace meant a void in the ground of international law for Scott and this 
concern with developing a jurisprudence to respond to the task of containing mimetic 
violence provides further understanding for this era’s recovery of Vitoria, as well as 
offering a new historical context for the reading of the Salamancan theologian 
alongside philosophical anthropologist Rene Girard performed in this article.
99
 
Furthermore, historians have argued that Scott held that ‘international law was more 
than a study or a profession; it was, in fact, a religion.’
 100
 Scott’s investment in 
‘international law as the basic ordering system for peace’ parallels the Giradian 
understanding of how law, acting as the religion after the end of religion contains 
violence through inheriting the sacrificial mandate.
101  
For it is also worthwhile 
recalling that Scott and the tradition of liberal American international law that he so 
greatly influenced and that would go on to be hegemonic over the course of the 
century, would turn away from the orthodox European colonialism in favour of an 
international community based upon a universal notion of humanity. Scott’s 
resurrection of Vitoria points towards the universal humanism within international 
law, which would replace the legal order based on explicit European imperial 
exceptionality that failed to contain the escalation of inter-communal violence in the 
first half of the twentieth century. With the formal end of the colonial legal order, 
previewed in the inter-war period with the mandate system of the League of Nations 
before being finally realised in the post-world war II context of the birth of the United 
Nations, international law would seek to anchor itself on an all-inclusive conception 
of universal humanity, one that continues to inform notions of human rights, 
humanitarian law and crimes against humanity in international law today. Scott 
advanced a holistic conception of international law, envisaging an intimacy in the 
relationship between domestic and international legal systems that realised what he 
refers to as the ‘oneness of the world.’
102
 This vision of international law erases the 
strict binaries between the people of the world and the states that wielded legal 
recognition on their behalf, for Scott ‘the artificial personality called the 
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state…[which] in fact have no existence separate and distinct from their 
incorporators,-the people who have made them what they are.’
103
 For Scott, a return 
to moral universalism would necessitate an extension of international law to 
incorporate a world order ontologically complete in itself. This order concerns the 
lives of all individuals included within the universal subject of humanity, as Scott 
elucidates,  
 
There can not be two standards [of morality]. There must be a 
single standard for the human being applying to all of his 
activities...There can be but one standard for the groups of 
individuals which we call states. There can be but one standard 
for the groups of individuals which, taken together, form 
humanity, and the groups which, as such, compose the 
international community. Humanity needs and the world must 




Yet despite, or as is my argument, as an inevitable result of this reworking of the 
Vitorian legacy for a new historical moment, this ‘single standard of humanity’ did 
not bring about the end of legal violence for colonial subjects, but as has been shown 
in a plethora of scholarly works, allowed for the persistence of an imperial structure 
of law, a new ‘dynamic of difference’ through new rubrics such as development or 
human rights.
105
 In the service of establishing a single standard of humanity to anchor 
the legal order, international law has facilitated military intervention, exploitative 
trade agreements and restrictive sanctions to imposed on the postcolonial world, 
troubling the presumption of law as the opposite of war and violence as seen in the 
founding statements of the UN.
106
 The colonial subject is brought inside of the legal 
order, only to be included in an already determined condition of exclusion. The 
concept of sacrifice, as expanded on over the course of this article, guides us towards 
seeing how this dynamic relates to the communality and the containment of 
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contagious violence that international law’s reboot in the twentieth century was 




A reading of the Vitorian tradition of liberal international law as ‘sacrificial’ rather 
than merely ‘humanitarian’ helps us understand why twentieth-century jurists drew on 
this tradition to shift international legal relations following the violence of the Great 
War and the decline of the formal colonial order. The texts that Scott and others 
retrieved from sixteenth-century Salamanca provide inspiration for the bringing 
together of a universal, post-colonial international community. However, once 
unpacked, these texts also offer a glimpse of the violence inflicted upon the colonised 
subject that swiftly follows their invitation into this community. Moreover, to add to 
the current literature on the subtle violence of the Vitorian ‘humanitarian’ schema, the 
reading of these texts alongside Girard’s theory of sacrificial social ordering explains 
the attraction of this archive for twentieth-century jurists who sought to produce an 
condition of abiding ‘peace’ within a international legal order in crisis. This offers a 
currently underdeveloped element to the critique of the Vitorian recovery made by 
Anghie and others by showing how the Vitorian schema does not only mask the 
persistence of imperial violence within the humanitarian law, but does so in service of 
producing an abiding peace amongst the international community itself, allowing this 
legitimised form of masked imperial violence to contain the mimetic warfare of 
sovereign rivalry that threatens to engulf all. The inclusive/exclusive positionality of 
the colonised allows a misrecognition of violence upon the colonised subject to do the 
religious/binding, cathartic work of sacrifice, and thus enable the international 
community to (re)generate itself through redirecting the violence onto a ‘legitimate’ 
target.
107
 In reading Vitoria’s works alongside Girard’s theory and unpacking the 
context in which the Salamancan theologian was recovered in the twentieth century, 
we are able to reconcile the debate over whether Vitoria is a liberal humanitarian or a 
colonial apologist, by understanding how liberal humanism, even as it emerged in 
contemporary international law to respond to the crises of the World Wars, has itself 
resulted from and depended on a sacrificial relation to those held to traverse the 
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boundaries of humanity. When we appreciate this productive operative function of 
imperial violence within a moral, universal community, we are then able to better 
understand why a humanitarian imperialism can be seen to persist within international 
law up until today. 
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